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a b s t r a c t
Early Warning Systems (EWS) are increasingly applied to mitigate the risks posed by natural hazards. To
compare the effect of EWS with alternative risk reduction measures and to optimize their design and
operation, their reliability and effectiveness must be quantiﬁed. In the present contribution, a framework
approach to the evaluation of threshold-based EWS for natural hazards is presented. The system
reliability is classically represented by the Probability of Detection (POD) and Probability of False Alarms
(PFA). We demonstrate how the EWS effectiveness, which is a measure of risk reduction, can be
formulated as a function of POD and PFA. To model the EWS and compute the reliability, we develop a
framework based on Bayesian Networks, which is further extended to a decision graph, facilitating the
optimization of the warning system. In a case study, the framework is applied to the assessment of an
existing debris ﬂow EWS. The application demonstrates the potential of the framework for identifying
the important factors inﬂuencing the effectiveness of the EWS and determining optimal warning
strategies and system conﬁgurations.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Early Warning Systems (EWS) are frequently applied as cost-
effective risk mitigation measures against natural hazards, which
provide timely information on future or ongoing events to reduce
loss of life and damages [1]. In contrast to structural protection
measures such as dams, galleries and rock fall nets, EWS are
cheaper, have shorter installation time and have lower impact on
the environment [2]. During the last decade, EWS have undergone
a rapid technical development and are today frequently imple-
mented as mitigation measures in an integrated risk management
approach [3]. To compare the economic efﬁciency of mitigation
measures and to identify the optimal risk reduction strategy, cost-
beneﬁt analyses are conducted. Following the standard conven-
tion, risk is deﬁned as the expected value of adverse consequences
[4]. The risk associated with an object i and scenario j is [5]
Rij ¼ pj  peij  vij  Ai ð1Þ
where pj is the probability of occurrence of a scenario j, peij is the
presence probability of object i in scenario j, vij is the vulnerability of
object i in scenario j and Ai the value of object i: The overall risk R is
evaluated by summing or integrating over all possible scenarios and
exposed objects
R¼
Xnscen
j ¼ 1
Xnobj
i ¼ 1
Rij ð2Þ
Existing guidelines recommend that the beneﬁts achieved due
to reduced risk are compared against the costs induced to develop
and maintain the measure [6,7]. Detailed guidelines for calculating
the effectiveness, i.e. the achieved risk reduction, are available for
structural risk mitigation measures [8]. However, for natural
hazard EWS such guidelines and procedures for quantifying the
effectiveness are lacking.
The reliability of EWS for natural hazards has been investigated in
the past. It is generally accepted that an evaluation of EWS must
include both the beneﬁts of risk reduction and the negative con-
sequences of missed events and false alarms [9–12]. A ﬁrst approach
for quantiﬁcation of the reliability of a ﬂood EWS was published by
Krzysztofowicz et al. [13]. Following earlier work carried out in other
areas e.g. [14], they quantify the reliability of a ﬂood EWS following the
concept of signal detection theory through the Probability of Detection
(POD) and the Probability of False Alarm (PFA). In more recent case
studies, the reliability of ﬂood EWS and their forecasting performance
are likewise expressed in terms of hits, missed events and false alarms
for different thresholds [15,16]. Similar concepts are used for the
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assessment of EWS operated for other natural hazard processes. E.g.,
Simmons and Sutter [17] express the Tornado warning performance of
the U.S. National Weather Service in terms of number of detected
events and the ratio between false alarms and warnings, and
Rheinberger [18] models the performance of avalanche warnings
through POD, PFA and additional measures. As shown by Paté-
Cornell [14], such an analysis is ideally based on detailed models of
the response to false warnings, facilitating the identiﬁcation of an
optimal trade-off between POD and PFA. In addition to POD and PFA,
the reliability of EWS depends on the probability of technical failures
of system components. Bründl and Heil [19] assessed the technical
reliability of the Swiss avalanche EWS in a case study. They conducted
a fault tree analysis to identify the most critical system components
but concluded that the method is not sufﬁcient to cover the entire
complexity of EWS. In a subsequent study, Sturny and Bründl [20]
apply Bayesian Networks (BN) to assess the technical reliability of a
glacier lake EWS. In Sättele et al. [21], we propose an enhanced BN to
evaluate the reliability of a debris ﬂow EWS, which computes POD and
PFA including the technical reliability of the system components.
In this contribution, a ﬁrst step towards a generic framework
for quantifying the effectiveness of EWS for natural hazards is
presented. EWS can be classiﬁed into alarm, warning and fore-
casting systems [22]. These classes differ in their degree of system
automation. Alarm systems detect ongoing hazard events, have
short lead times and include fully automated threshold-based
decisions. Warning and forecasting systems monitor precursors
to predict events and are only partly automated including model-
based human decisions. In this contribution, we limit ourselves to
alarm systems, and show how their effectiveness can be quantiﬁed
from their POD and PFA using a BN. We ﬁrst deﬁne the terms
reliability and effectiveness in the context of alarm systems, before
we propose a framework BN and an associated Decision Graph
(DG). In a case study, we apply the framework on an existing
debris ﬂow threshold-based alarm system to ﬁnd the optimal
system conﬁguration, to identify the main factors inﬂuencing the
system effectiveness and to demonstrate the applicability of the
novel framework approach.
2. Reliability of alarm systems for natural hazards
Following [23], reliability is deﬁned as the “ability of an item to
fulﬁll a required function under stated conditions for a stated
period of time”. An EWS for natural hazards fulﬁlls its designated
function if it detects all hazard events in a timely manner, transfers
the warning to the effected persons and leads to measures that
avoid damage and loss of life.
This requires (a) that the system and its components are
available and work perfectly, and (b) that the monitoring and
the data interpretation units are able to perfectly distinguish
between hazard events and background noise. The requirement
(a), to which we refer as technical reliability, can be quantiﬁed
using the classical methods for assessing the reliability of technical
systems, including fault trees, bow-tie models, failure mode and
effective analysis [24,25]. More recently, BN have been applied as a
ﬂexible and powerful alternative to these models [26]. The
requirement (b), to which we refer as inherent system reliability,
is quantiﬁed through POD and PFA using the concepts of signal
detection theory [27], which has found applications in many ﬁeld
including medical testing [28,29] and non-destructive testing of
technical systems [30,31]. In the context of alarm systems, one can
deﬁne the POD and the PFA as
POD¼ E number of detected events
number of events
 
ð3Þ
PFA¼ E number of days with false alarms
number of event free days
 
ð4Þ
where E½U  is the expectation operator.
Note that the PFA must be deﬁned using a reference unit, which
is chosen here as days, but other temporal or spatial references can
be appropriate. To ensure comparability, it is important to use the
same unit consistency throughout all studies. Unfortunately, this is
often overlooked and many studies do not even state the reference
unit of the PFA.
POD and PFA are both inﬂuenced by the interpretation of the
monitoring data. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the basic
concepts of signal detection theory. The measured signal can be
either due to a hazard event H or due to noise N. The decision to
issue a warning is based on the threshold t. If the measured signal
is larger than t, a warning is issued. With f SjHðsÞ being the
conditional probability density function (PDF) of the signal S given
a hazard event H, and f SjHðsÞ being the conditional PDF of S given
no hazard event H, it is [27,32]
PODðtÞ ¼
Z 1
t
f SjHðsÞds ð5Þ
PFAðtÞ ¼
Z 1
t
f SjHðsÞds ð6Þ
With increasing threshold t, both the POD and the PFA
decreases. This dependence between the two is graphically embo-
died in the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, see Fig. 1.
ROC curves summarize the reliability of EWS for varying thresh-
olds. They graphically represent the system reliability as a trade-
off between POD and PFA.
The overall system reliability as a combination of the technical
reliability and the inherent system reliability is also expressed in
terms of ROC curves. To this end, we compute the POD and PFA as
the conditional probability of a warning given a hazard event,
including the probability of system component failures. This is
achieved by modeling both the inherent and the technical relia-
bility jointly in a Bayesian network, as described in Section 4.
3. Effectiveness of alarm systems for natural hazards
It is commonly accepted that the effectiveness of a mitigation
measure equates to the relative reduction of the overall risk [5,8].
We propose to calculate the effectiveness of an EWS Ew from R
being the overall risk without the EWS and RðWÞ the risk with the
EWS system installed
Ew ¼ 1
RðWÞ
R
ð7Þ
Both R and RðWÞ are evaluated according to Eqs. (1) and (2). EWS
aim to generate information before a hazard event causes damage;
they reduce risk primarily by mitigating the exposure probability
peij of persons and mobile objects i in a hazard scenario j,
following Eq. (1). If the EWS provides sufﬁcient lead time, the risk
can be additionally reduced through the implementation of
supplementary intervention measures such as e.g. mobile ﬂood
protection. Consequently, the effectiveness of EWS Ew is primarily
a result of the reduced exposure probability peij, but can also be
due to other factors such as the vulnerability of object i in scenario
j in Eq. (1).
In the present contribution, we focus on alarm systems with
limited lead time, during which the only possible action is to
reduce the presence probability from a value peij without warning
to a value peðWÞij . Combining Eq. (7) with Eqs. (1) and (2), the
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effectiveness for this case becomes
EW ¼ 1
Pnscen
j ¼ 1
Pnobj
i ¼ 1 pj  pe
ðWÞ
ij  vij  AiPnscen
j ¼ 1
Pnobj
i ¼ 1 pj  peij  vij  Ai
ð8Þ
Most alarm systems are installed primarily to warn people.
Thus, nobj is the number of exposed people and it is reasonable to
assume that the exposure probability is the same for different i, i.e.
peij ¼ pej. Finally, we limit ourselves to a situation with only one
relevant scenario j¼ 1, and the warning effectiveness then reduces
to
Ew ¼ 1
pj  pe Wð Þj 
Pnobj
i ¼ 1 vij  Ai
pj  pej 
Pnobj
i ¼ 1 vij  Ai
¼ 1
peðWÞj
pej
ð9Þ
The alarm system reduces the exposure probability to peðWÞj .
This reduction is equal to the probability that a warning is issued,
transferred to the target persons and that the affected people
comply with the warning. The former corresponds to the POD, the
latter to the Probability of Compliance (POC). Therefore,
peðWÞj ¼ pejð1POD POCÞ ð10Þ
Inserting in Eq. (9), the effectiveness becomes
EW ¼ POD POC ð11Þ
The POC, i.e. the degree to which warnings are followed in
practice, is strongly dependent on the PFA. A high number of false
alarms reduces the POC to an issued warning, due to a loss of trust
that is known as the cry-wolf syndrome [33,34]. We calculate POC
as a result of a basic compliance probability POC0 and a compli-
ance reduction factor due to false alarms RF PFAð Þ
POC¼ POC0  RFðPFAÞ ð12Þ
For the case study, we estimate the general compliance rate
POC0 ¼ 0:95 from trafﬁc analyses [35,36]. One analysis investi-
gated the behavior of pedestrians towards red lights and revealed
that 5% ignore red-lights. The second analysis considered the
behavior of cyclists, where about 7% ignore red lights. To estimate
the compliance reduction factor due to false alarms RF PFAð Þ we
adopt results from a case study that assessed the compliance
frequency of students as a function of false alarms [37]. The
resulting compliance frequencies (corresponding to our RF) at
different levels of the False Alarm Ratio (FAR) are shown in Fig. 2,
together with a ﬁtted quadratic function
RF FARð Þ ¼ 0:34 FAR2 0:66 FARþ1 ð13Þ
To incorporate the effect of decreasing compliance for a given
number of false alarms in the effectiveness of the alarm system,
the FAR, which is deﬁned as the ratio of false to correct alarms, is
related to the PFA by
FAR¼ PFAPrðHÞ
PrðAÞ ð14Þ
Fig. 1. Conditional Probability Density Functions (PDFs) representing noise and a hazard event and the Probability of Detection (POD) and Probability of False Alarms (PFA)
for two different thresholds (upper part). Correlated Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve for varying thresholds and the optimal performance of an EWS
(lower part).
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where PrðHÞ is the probability of no hazard event and Pr Að Þ is the
probability of an alarm (both correct and false) on a given day. For the
case study considered here, it is approximately PrðHÞ  95% and
Pr Að Þ  5%, therefore FAR 19 PFA. Combining Eqs. (11)–(14), we
obtain the effectiveness as a function of POD and PFA, see also Fig. 3
Ew ¼ POD 0:95 0:34 FAR2 0:66 FARþ1
 
¼ POD 0:95116 PFA2 11:9 PFA
 
; PFAr 1
19
ð15Þ
4. Bayesian network to quantify the system reliability and
maximize the effectiveness
To probabilistically model the system reliability for varying
thresholds of an existing debris ﬂow alarm system and to identify
the threshold combination that implies the optimal effectiveness, we
design a BN and an associated DG. A BN is a graphical probabilistic
model, in which each node represents a random variable and the arcs
among the nodes characterize the stochastic dependence among
these [38,39]. In many instances, the arcs can be constructed
following the causal relations between the random variables [40].
To each node, a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) is attached,
specifying the probability of the random variable conditional on its
parent nodes. The BN facilitates the computation of the probability of
any set of nodes conditional on observations of other nodes. BNs can
be extended to DGs for decision making under uncertainty, whereby
the strategy that maximizes the expected utility is sought [38,41].
DGs are essentially BNs augmented with decision and utility nodes,
wherein the latter describe the preferences of the decision maker.
BN allow the incorporation of expert knowledge, can deal with
rare data and are based on an intuitive modeling approach. In
recent years BN have been applied frequently for environmental
modeling and for the evaluation of natural hazard risks [42–44].
Applications of BN for modeling EWS are presented by Medina-
Cetina and Nadim [45], who present a BN of a landslide EWS and
apply it to determine optimal thresholds, and by Blaser et al. [46],
who use BN to assess a Tsunami EWS in Sumatra.
Our framework BN to model the reliability of alarm systems for
natural hazards is designed according to three main units of a EWS
[47]: monitoring, data interpretation and information dissemina-
tion (Fig. 4). The monitoring unit is equipped with sensors, which
continuously monitor the environment. In the data interpretation
unit, the measured data are analyzed to detect irregularities and
make the ﬁnal warning decision. The information dissemination
unit conveys the warning information to responsible authorities
and ﬁnally to endangered persons and responsible authorities.
This BN describes the causal chain from the event to the warning.
Component failure nodes are included to model the technical
reliability of the system dependent on the failure probabilities of
different system components. The node “event indicated” repre-
sents the inherent system reliability as a function of the selected
threshold. To compute the POD, the top node is set to the state
“hazard event¼true” and the BN is evaluated; the POD is then
obtained as the probability of a warning. Likewise, the PFA is
obtained by setting the top node to “hazard event¼ false”.
By varying the threshold, different combinations of POD and PFA
are obtained, allowing the construction of the ROC curve.
By adding a utility node, the BN is extended to a DG, which can
automatically identify the optimal warning threshold (Fig. 5). This
is of particular use when multiple sensors are installed. In this
case, thresholds must be set for all sensors and combination rules
(logic operators) must be deﬁned, e.g. that a warning is issued only
if more than x sensors have a signal above their threshold. This
Fig. 2. Compliance frequency at different levels of False Alarm Ratio (FAR),
according to [37].
Fig. 3. Effectiveness as a function of Probability of Detection (POD) and Probability
of False Alarms (PFA) for the case study.
Fig. 4. Schematic framework of a Bayesian Network (BN) to model the reliability in
terms of Probability of Detection (POD) and Probability of False Alarms (PFA) for
alarm systems.
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leads to a high-dimensional optimization problem, which can be
effectively solved with the DG.
5. Case study: the Illgraben debris ﬂow alarm system
The system under investigation is located at the Illgraben catch-
ment in the western part of the Swiss Alps. The catchment ranges in
elevation from 610 m a.s.l. to 2716 m a.s.l. and half of the catchment
area (4 km2) is covered by bedrock and debris deposits. Due to the
geological conditions there is a remarkably high occurrence rate of
debris ﬂows. A debris ﬂow is a spontaneous fast-ﬂowing mixture of
water and solid particles, which typically consists of surges . In 2006,
the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research
WSL designed an alarm system to protect local residents and tourists
frequently crossing the catchment (Fig. 6). In the present case study,
we assess the reliability and effectiveness of the existing Illgraben
system, which is a typical fully-automated threshold-based system
[48].
The monitoring unit includes ﬁve sensors that are located close
to the release area to detect events in real-time. In the upper
catchment, one single sensor, Geophone 1 (G1), continuously
monitors ground vibrations. Further down in the catchment, some
hundred meters below, two geophones, geophone 2 (G2) and
geophone 3 (G3), measure ground vibrations and two radar
devices, radar 1 (R1) and radar 2 (R2), measure the ﬂow depth
in the river bed. The upper G1 is controlled by one logger and the
remaining four sensors are controlled by a second logger. The
power at these remote locations is supplied via solar panels and
batteries. The loggers build an interface between the monitoring
unit and the data interpretation unit. If predeﬁned threshold
values in the data loggers are exceeded, a warning call is
automatically activated via modem and transmitted to the valley.
The incoming warning calls are forwarded via two communication
devices to the information dissemination unit. To release the
warning information to endangered persons in the catchment,
three alarm stations are located close to three crossings of the
streambed. Each station consists of an audible signal and a red
light. The lead time of the system is determined by the velocity of
the debris ﬂow and the runtime between the lower sensor units
and the upper crossing and is in the range between 5 and 15 min.
6. BN to model the reliability of the Illgraben alarm system
By applying the BN framework (Fig. 4) to the system sketch of
the alarm system (Fig. 6), the BN depicted in Fig. 7 is obtained. The
oval gray nodes in the BN represent the causal chain from the
event to the warning. This chain can also be interpreted as the
information ﬂow. For each sensor, a local interpretation is made in
node “event indicated”, which is in state “true” only if the sensor
signal exceeds the corresponding threshold. The information from
sensors in the lower catchment (G2, G3, R1, R2) is merged in the
node “warning issued 2”, where it is decided whether or not to
issue a warning, following the selected criterion deﬁned in the
node “decision criteria”. The node “warning transmitted” is in
state “true” if either of the two warnings is issued (OR connection).
If the warning is transmitted, a warning is released at each of the
three stations, given that no component failures occur. Therefore,
the ﬁnal node “warning” should in principle have four states
0,1,2,3, corresponding to the number of stations where warnings
are released. However, to comply with the binary deﬁnition of POD
Fig. 5. Schematic Decision Graph (DG) to identify the optimal threshold combina-
tion that maximizes the alarm system effectiveness.
Fig. 6. The components of the Illgraben debris ﬂow alarm system can be described in three main units: monitoring, data interpretation and information dissemination.
M. Sättele et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 142 (2015) 192–202196
and PFA, this node has only two states “yes” and “no”. To account
for the number of warnings released, the conditional probability of
“warning¼yes” is 0.33 if two stations release a warning respec-
tively 0.67 if only one station releases a warning. The BN is
implemented with the free GeNIe software [49].
6.1. Technical reliability
The technical reliability of the system describes the probability that
failures of technical system components (TSC) lead to a malfunctioning
of the alarm system. The TSC are the white nodes in the BN of Fig. 7.
They are modeled by binary random variables, with states “function-
ing” and “failed”. Failures occur following a Poisson process, i.e. they
occur randomly in time and independently of each other. The
probability of a TSC failure at time Pr F tð Þð Þ is calculated as [50]
Pr F tð Þð Þ  λ E½Tr  ð16Þ
where λ is the failure rate of the TSC and E½Tr  is the expected time it
takes to detect and repair a failure. The approximation holds for small
values of λ, i.e. for λ{1=E½Tr  . In the Illgraben system, E½Tr is one
day for all TSCs, because diagnosis tools are incorporated into the
system to ensure that failures are detected within one day. If the
failures cannot be repaired immediately, additional operational mea-
sures are taken to ensure detection of an event.
The failure rate λ of TSC includes both internal failures, with
corresponding rate λIF , and failures caused by external inﬂuences,
with rate λEF
λ ¼ λIFþ λEF ð17Þ
The internal failure rate λIF is directly derived from theMean Time
To Failure ðMTTFÞ or, for repairable parts, from the Mean Time
Between Failure ðMTBFÞ, as speciﬁed by the suppliers. As an example,
for radar devices the MTTF is 60 years and the corresponding internal
failure rate is λIF ¼ 4:5 105 per day. If MTTF or MTBF are not
speciﬁed by the supplier, expert judgment is used to estimate λIF .
Failures probabilities due to external causes λEF are more difﬁcult
to quantify. EWS are primarily installed in remote areas in alpine
regions, close to rivers and glaciers, in high altitudes, steep catch-
ments and are thus prone to numerous external failure causes.
Lightning, humidity, storm and extreme temperatures are the most
frequent external factors that cause failures on system components.
Rock falls, snow avalanches and snow load, ice blocks, ﬂood, vegeta-
tion, mud, dust and fog are site or system speciﬁc causes that can
lead to failures of TSC. Additional potential failure causes such as
construction, vandalism and animals must also be considered. To
estimate λEF , we consult experts and evaluate historical data from
repair records. Since the installation of the Illgraben debris ﬂow
system in 2006, one solar panel was destroyed by a rock fall. In the
Illgraben, rock fall is common and we assume the failure rate to be
3 104 d1, which corresponds to a return period of 10 years.
System failure due to extreme ﬂoods, lightning, animals, vandalism
and extreme temperatures have not occurred yet, but should be
considered as possible failure causes. We assume a failure rate of
Fig. 7. Tailored BN to model the reliability of the Illgraben debris ﬂow alarm system.
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3:0  105 d1 for each external failure, which corresponds to a
return period of 100 years. Summing up these rates, we receive an
overall λEF ¼ 4:5  104 d1 for all TSC. This is in good agreement
with available repair records.
To quantify the effect that technical failures have on the overall
system reliability, we incorporate technical failure rates λ for all
TSC in the BN. In doing so, the maximum POD (achieved with the
optimal thresholds described later in the paper) is decreased by
0.34%. Thereof, 0.12% are due to internal failures (λIF ) and 0.22% are
due to external failures (λEF ).
6.2. Inherent system reliability
The inherent reliability of the Illgraben system, as expressed
through POD and PFA, depends on the selected threshold for each
sensor signal. To analyze the inﬂuence of these thresholds,
decision nodes representing varying thresholds are included in
the BN/DG (Fig. 7). In addition, a decision node “decision criteria”
allows various criteria to be analyzed for issuing warnings based
on the indications from the individual sensors, e.g. a warning is
issued if at least two sensors indicate an event.
Each of the ﬁve signal nodes in the monitoring unit are described
by the conditional PDF of maximum measured signal during a day,
conditional on whether or not a debris ﬂow event occurs during that
day. These conditional probability distributions correspond to those
of the signal detection theory as illustrated in Fig. 1. To estimate
them, recorded sensor data from the period between 1st of May 2008
and 24th September 2012 were used. During this period, 44 debris
ﬂow events were recorded on 883 days. For each of the ﬁve sensors, a
probability distribution is ﬁtted to the observed signals for days with
and for days without events, as displayed in Fig. 8 for geophone G2.
For inclusion in the BN, the signal is discretized in 10 classes, as
exemplarily shown in Table 1 for G2.
To quantify the inherent reliability of individual sensors, POD
and the PFA are evaluated from the conditional distributions of the
signal following Eqs. (5)–(6). The resulting ROC curves that
represent the reliability of individual sensors for varying thresh-
olds are presented in Fig. 9. They indicate that the inherent
reliability of the individual sensors varies strongly. Geophone G1
performs best and reaches a reliability close to the optimum with
POD¼ 0:992 and PFA¼ 104, whereas the remaining sensors have
much lower inherent reliability. The difference among the reli-
abilities of the sensors is mainly due to the positioning of the
sensors in the ﬁeld, which inﬂuences their ability to detect
hazardous debris ﬂow events and the amount of external dis-
turbances, e.g. from animals, humans, rock falls.
6.3. Decision graph to identify optimal threshold combinations
With ﬁve sensors, and all the signals discretized in 10 classes,
there are 95 ¼ 59 103 possible threshold combinations, each of
which leads to a POD and a PFA. Furthermore, for combing the
individual sensor results different decision criteria can be deﬁned,
which further increase the number of possible warning strategies.
For the Illgraben case study, two such decision criteria are
considered. Either one individual sensor can issue a warning
individually or a warning is issued when geophone 1 or at least
one geophone and one radar device in the lower catchment
indicate an event. The optimal warning criterion in all instances
for the Illgraben case study is the second criterion.
Most of the possible warning strategies will be sub-optimal. Of
interest are only the Pareto optimal warning strategies, for which
it holds that no other strategy exists with simultaneously higher
POD and lower PFA. To identify the Pareto optimal solutions, we
employ the DG of Fig. 5. In the utility node, we modify the ratio of
cost of false alarm to cost of a missed event. The costs of false
alarm include spendings for activating the alarm units and are
typically low compared to the expected cost of a missed event.
Lattest, involve costs that are caused through damage and loss of
life. The DG is used to identify the optimal threshold combination
and decision criterion for each utility ratio. In this way, we obtain a
set of Pareto optimal solutions, which allow the construction of
Fig. 8. Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the signal of geophone 2. Solid
lines represent observed data and dashed lines the ﬁtted probability distributions.
Table 1
Discretized probability distribution of signals measured by geophone 2 on days
with and without event.
Class Impulses/s No event Event
1 r1 0.8332 0.0767
2 41 r5 0.0512 0.1071
3 45 r10 0.0295 0.0663
4 410 r20 0.0305 0.0772
5 420 r30 0.0163 0.0492
6 430 r40 0.0102 0.0362
7 440 r50 0.0069 0.0286
8 450 r200 0.0208 0.1789
9 4200 r500 0.0014 0.1075
10 4500 0.0001 0.2713
Fig. 9. Receiver Operator Characteristic ROC curves illustrate the reliability of
sensors for nine predeﬁned thresholds. The highest threshold is represented by
operation points left. Geophone 1 shows the best performance.
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the system ROC curve. In Table 2, the optimal threshold combina-
tions for 20 utility ratios are presented, together with the corre-
sponding POD, PFA and effectiveness, as computed with Eq. (15).
The results are also graphically illustrated in Fig. 10. Here, the
technical reliability is already included, i.e. the results show the
overall sytem reliability and effectiveness.
6.4. Reliability and effectiveness of the Illgraben alarm system
The POD and PFA of the Pareto optimal warning strategies for
the Illgraben alarm system are summarized in Table 2 and Fig. 10.
Using these values, the overall ROC curve of the system is
constructed, as depicted in Fig. 11. This ROC curve is overlaid with
the system effectiveness calculated as a function of POD and PFA,
following Fig. 3.
Overall, the reliability of the Illgraben debris ﬂow alarm system
is high, and so is its efﬁciency. According to Table 2, the warning
strategy that maximizes the effectiveness of the system is the one
found with utility ratios 0.7/0.8 and 0.9. This warning strategy has
low thresholds for sensors G1 and R1, whereas the thresholds of
the remaining three sensors G2, G3 and R2, are set to their
maximum. Geophone G3 still has a POD of 0.79 even with the
largest threshold (see also Fig. 9). For G2 and R2, these optimal
maximum thresholds indicate that these sensors do not contribute
to the system reliability and may even decrease the overall
effectiveness of the Illgraben debris ﬂow system.
To assess the inﬂuence of individual technical system compo-
nents (TSCs) on the overall system reliability and the resulting
effectiveness, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. For each TSC i, the
system effectiveness with the optimal warning strategy is recal-
culated once by assuming that the TSC i failed and once by
assuming that the TSC i is perfectly reliable. This is done by simply
setting the node of TSC i to “functioning” or “failure” respectively.
The difference in effectiveness between the system with the
perfectly reliable TSC i and the original system is called Effective-
ness Achievement Worth, as it corresponds to the Risk Achieve-
ment Worth importance measure [51]. Accordingly, the difference
Table 2
Pareto optimal solutions for varying utility ratios.
Utility ratio¼cost
of false alarm/cost
of miss
Threshold POD PFA Effectiveness
G1 G2 G3 R1 R2
0.009/0.01 2 8 7 3 9 0.996772 0.002851 0.912171
0.02 2 8 8 3 8 0.996342 0.000783 0.937166
0.03/0.04/0.05 2 8 8 3 9 0.996336 0.000775 0.937260
0.06/0.07/0.08/
0.09/ 0.1
2 8 8 4 8 0.996072 0.000520 0.940068
0.2 2 8 9 3 9 0.995582 0.000339 0.941772
0.3 2 8 9 4 8 0.995339 0.000277 0.942281
0.4/ 0.5/ 0.6 2 9 9 4 8 0.995125 0.000248 0.942423
0.7/ 0.8/ 0.9 2 9 9 4 9 0.995110 0.000247 0.942424
1 3 8 9 4 8 0.992215 0.000078 0.941680
Fig. 10. Reliability and effectiveness of Pareto optimal warning strategies, as shown in Table 2.
Fig. 11. The resulting Receiver Operator Characteristic ROC curve of the Illgraben
alarm system, overlaid on the effectiveness.
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in effectiveness between the original system and the one with TSC
i failed is called Effectiveness Reduction Worth, corresponding to
the Risk Reduction Worth importance measure. The results are
summarized in Table 3, where TSCs are ordered according to their
importance. Overall, the Effectiveness Achievement Worth of all
TSCs is small; indicating that little can be gained from improving
the reliability of individual TSCs. On the other hand, the Effective-
ness Reduction Worth of the TSCs that are responsible for the data
transmitting within the Illgraben system (modem 3, call receiver 1,
call transmitter 1, mobile network or power supply), is large
(9:42 101Þ. Upon failure of any of these TSCs, the system will
not work, which is a consequence of the missing redundancy.
Redundantly constructed data transmitting devices would there-
fore improve the system reliability and so its effectiveness con-
siderably. However, as the Effectiveness Achievement Worth
shows, the effect would be limited. For a further analysis of
possible modiﬁcations in the system conﬁguration, a cost analysis
should be conducted.
The non-redundant TSCs in the information dissemination unit
(call receiver 2/3/4, battery 3/4) are among the most critical TSCs
and so their Effectiveness Reduction Worth ð3:10 101Þ is
signiﬁcant. Because all three alarm stations are equipped with
redundant release devices, an audible signal and a red light, these
two devices are less critical ð1:82 104Þ.
The overall high system effectiveness is mainly a consequence
of the high reliability of geophone G1 in the upper catchment. If
that single geophone G1 or the TSCs essential for its functioning
(logger 1, modem 1, battery 1) fail, the loss in effectiveness is large
ð1:77 101Þ. The inﬂuence of this individual sensor exceeds the
joint inﬂuence of all four sensors in the lower catchment. The
latter is quantiﬁed through the inﬂuence of logger 2, modem 2 or
battery 2, whose failures would render all four sensors in the
lower catchment useless. The inﬂuence of the individual sensors
varies drastically. While G3 and R1 have a considerable effect on
the effectiveness of the Illgraben system, G2 and in particular R2
are assumed to be sensors with minor signiﬁcance. Nevertheless,
the positioning of the four sensors in the lower catchment is
limited. The position is chosen to detect debris ﬂow events that
could enter the main channel below the upper geophone at the
earliest possible moment.
7. Discussion
EWS for natural hazards are safety-critical systems, whose
reliability and effectiveness depends on the technical reliability
of its components and the inherent ability of the system to
correctly identify the hazard events. The framework proposed in
this paper combines these two aspects into a single model, using a
Bayesian network (BN). The BN is constructed to calculate the
reliability of automated alarm systems in terms of Probability of
Detection (POD) and Probability of False Alarms (PFA) as a function
of the thresholds set for all sensors. The reliability is deﬁned
probabilistically, in agreement with existing concepts of risk
management for natural hazards. The ﬂexibility of the BN makes
it straightforward to include potential technical failures of system
components into this analysis. By extending the BN to a decision
graph (DG), we furthermore ﬁnd an effective way to solve the
multi-dimensional optimization problem of identifying the opti-
mal warning strategy with multiple sensors, i.e. the determination
of the optimal combination of signal thresholds at the individual
sensors.
We deﬁne effectiveness as a relative measure of the achieved
risk reduction. We show that if a EWS is installed primarily for
limiting the presence of people in the endangered area, the
effectiveness can be assessed as a function of the POD and PFA
alone. A crucial point is the quantiﬁcation of the effect of false
alarms on people's compliance with warnings. It is well known
that false alarms deteriorate compliance, the so-called cry wolf
syndrome, but studies quantifying this effect for natural hazard
warnings are lacking, and assumptions have to be made on a
relatively weak basis. Even when owners and operators of EWS do
not intend to quantify the effectiveness, they must still understand
the effect of false alarms, in determining the maximum acceptable
PFA of a system.
The approach presented is applicable to automated alarm
systems with limited lead times. Modiﬁcations will be necessary
for EWS that offer larger lead times, such as in the case of slow
rock movement process or ﬂood hazards in the lower catchment
area. For such events, the system reliability will be a function of
the lead time. It will then be necessary to ﬁnd a trade-off not only
between POD and PFA, as in the current study, but also between
Table 3
Inﬂuence of individual technical system components (TSC) on effectiveness.
Ranking TSC Effectiveness TSC¼“functioning” Effectiveness achievement worth Effectiveness TSC¼“failure” Effectiveness reduction worth
1 Modem 3 0.943741 1.32103 0.0 9.42101
Call receiver 1
Call transmitter
Power network
Mobile network
2 Battery 3/4 0.942581 1.57104 0.632004 3.10101
Call receiver 2/3/4
3 Geophone 1 0.942509 8.45105 0.764853 1.77101
Logger 1
Modem 1
Battery 1
4 Modem 2 0.942427 3.30106 0.935417 7.01103
Logger 2
Battery 2
5 Radar 1 0.942427 3.24106 0.935876 6.55103
6 Geophone 3 0.942426 2.19106 0.937827 4.60103
7 Solar panel 3/4 0.942426 1.45106 0.939547 2.88103
8 Solar panel 1 0.942425 8.31107 0.940781 1.64103
9 Geophone 2 0.942424 2.34107 0.942048 3.77104
10 Red light 1/2/3 0.942424 1.04107 0.942242 1.82104
Audible signal 1/2/3
11 Solar panel 2 0.942424 3.51108 0.942359 6.50105
12 Radar 2 0.942424 8.16109 0.942405 1.91105
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POD, PFA and the lead time. For warning and forecasting EWS,
decisions are not fully automated. For these systems, a compre-
hensive evaluation of EWS reliability and effectiveness has to
include human-decision making and the quality of predictive
models. Nevertheless, parts of the framework introduced in this
paper are applicable also to such EWS, as we demonstrate in a case
study on a rockslide warning system [52].
For the investigated debris ﬂow alarm system, the ﬁnal sensi-
tivity analysis showed that most of the individual technical
components have little impact on the reliability, with the excep-
tion of the non-redundant communication system and the most
important sensors. For these components, additional protection
measures such as fences, rockfall nets and standardized double-
wall box may be installed to protect them. The case study
furthermore revealed that besides the types and numbers of
sensors, mainly their positioning in the ﬁeld is crucial for the
inherent system reliability. Finally, we ﬁnd that the combination of
multiple sensors can increase the POD while keeping PFA low, but
only to a certain level.
The approach presented can be applied to optimize existing
alarm systems, but can also assist in the design phase when a new
system conﬁguration is developed. In the latter case, cost-beneﬁt
analyses should be conducted to assess and compare different
system conﬁgurations. In contrast to the case study presented,
data availability is a problem for most applications. The fact that
the sensitivity of sensors to a hazard event is often strongly site-
speciﬁc—as shown by our case study—makes it difﬁcult to transfer
models describing the inherent reliability of individual sensors
among different applications. During a test phase, site-speciﬁc
models may be developed, following the procedure presented in
this paper. However, during the design phase or for locations with
only few hazard events such an approach is not feasible. Models
for the inherent reliability of sensors must then be developed
based on expert opinions or using detailed physical models, e.g. as
developed in structural reliability applications.
8. Conclusion
We propose a framework to quantify the reliability of alarm
systems for natural hazards based on Bayesian network (BN),
accounting for both technical failures and the inherent system
ability. The reliability is expressed in terms of the Probability of
Detection (POD) and the Probability of False Alarms (PFA). To ﬁnd a
warning strategy that offers an optimal trade-off between these
two, we deﬁne the system effectiveness as a function of POD and
PFA as a measure of risk reduction. The optimal warning strategy is
the one maximizing the system effectiveness. We show that by
enhancing the BN to a decision graph, one is able to automatically
identify an optimal warning strategy for systems with multiple
sensors, where the decision on whether or not to issue an alarm is
based on a combination of signals from all these sensors. By
implementing the framework for a debris ﬂow alarm system, we
are able to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the
framework for real alarm systems installed in practice.
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